ln-628-concurrency-auditor

SKILL.md

Paths: File paths (references/, ../ln-*) are relative to this skill directory.

Concurrency Auditor (L3 Worker)

Type: L3 Worker

Specialized worker auditing concurrency, async patterns, and cross-process resource access.

Purpose & Scope

Audit concurrency (Category 11: High Priority)

7 checks: async races, thread safety, TOCTOU, deadlocks, blocking I/O, resource contention, cross-process races

Two-layer detection: grep finds candidates, agent reasons about context

Calculate compliance score (X/10)

Inputs

MANDATORY READ: Load references/audit_worker_core_contract.md.
MANDATORY READ: Load references/mcp_tool_preferences.md and references/mcp_integration_patterns.md
Receives contextStore with: tech_stack, best_practices, codebase_root, output_dir.

Use hex-graph first when dataflow or call-path analysis materially improves concurrency findings. Use hex-line first for local code reads when available. If MCP is unavailable, unsupported, or not indexed, continue with built-in Read/Grep/Glob/Bash and state the fallback in the report.

Workflow

MANDATORY READ: Load references/two_layer_detection.md for detection methodology.

Parse context -- extract tech_stack, language, output_dir from contextStore

Per check (1-7):

Layer 1: Grep/Glob scan to find candidates

Layer 2: Read 20-50 lines around each candidate. Apply check-specific critical questions. Classify: confirmed / false positive / needs-context

Collect confirmed findings with severity, location, effort, recommendation

Calculate score per references/audit_scoring.md

Write Report -- build in memory, write to {output_dir}/ln-628--global.md (atomic single Write)

Return Summary to coordinator

Audit Rules

Unified severity escalation: For ALL checks -- if finding affects payment/auth/financial code -> escalate to CRITICAL regardless of other factors.

1. Async/Event-Loop Races (CWE-362)

What: Shared state corrupted across await/yield boundaries in single-threaded async code.

Layer 1 -- Grep patterns:

Language
Pattern
Grep

JS/TS
Read-modify-write across await
\w+\s*[+\-*/]?=\s*.*await (e.g., result += await something)

JS/TS
Check-then-initialize race
if\s*\(!?\w+\) followed by \w+\s*=\s*await in same block

Python
Read-modify-write across await
\w+\s*[+\-*/]?=\s*await inside async def

Python
Shared module-level state in async
Module-level \w+\s*= + modified inside async def

All
Shared cache without lock
`.set(

Layer 2 -- Critical questions:

Is the variable shared (module/global scope) or local?

Can two async tasks interleave at this await point?

Is there a lock/mutex/semaphore guarding the access?

Severity: CRITICAL (payment/auth) | HIGH (user-facing) | MEDIUM (background)

Safe pattern exclusions: Local variables, const declarations, single-use await (no interleaving possible).

Effort: M

2. Thread/Goroutine Safety (CWE-366)

What: Shared mutable state accessed from multiple threads/goroutines without synchronization.

Layer 1 -- Grep patterns:

Language
Pattern
Grep

Go
Map access without mutex
map\[.*\].*= in struct without sync.Mutex or sync.RWMutex

Go
Variable captured by goroutine
go func + variable from outer scope modified

Python
Global modified in threads
global\s+\w+ in function + threading.Thread in same file

Java
HashMap shared between threads
HashMap + Thread|Executor|Runnable in same class without synchronized|ConcurrentHashMap

Rust
Rc in multi-thread context
Rc<RefCell + thread::spawn|tokio::spawn in same file

Node.js
Worker Threads shared state
workerData|SharedArrayBuffer|parentPort + mutable access without Atomics

Layer 2 -- Critical questions:

Is this struct/object actually shared between threads? (single-threaded code -> FP)

Is mutex/lock in embedded struct or imported module? (grep may miss it)

Is go func capturing by value (safe) or by reference (unsafe)?

Severity: CRITICAL (payment/auth) | HIGH (data corruption possible) | MEDIUM (internal)

Safe pattern exclusions: Go map in init() or main() before goroutines start. Rust Arc<Mutex<T>> (already safe). Java Collections.synchronizedMap().

Effort: M

3. TOCTOU -- Time-of-Check Time-of-Use (CWE-367)

What: Resource state checked, then used, but state can change between check and use.

Layer 1 -- Grep patterns:

Language
Check
Use
Grep

Python
os.path.exists()
open()
os\.path\.exists\( near open\( on same variable

Python
os.access()
os.open()
os\.access\( near os\.open\(|open\(

Node.js
fs.existsSync()
fs.readFileSync()
existsSync\( near readFileSync\(|readFile\(

Node.js
fs.accessSync()
fs.openSync()
accessSync\( near openSync\(

Go
os.Stat()
os.Open()
os\.Stat\( near os\.Open\(|os\.Create\(

Java
.exists()
new FileInputStream
\.exists\(\) near new File|FileInputStream|FileOutputStream

Layer 2 -- Critical questions:

Is the check used for control flow (vulnerable) or just logging (safe)?

Is there a lock/retry around the check-then-use sequence?

Is the file in a temp directory controlled by the application (lower risk)?

Could an attacker substitute the file (symlink attack)?

Severity: CRITICAL (security-sensitive: permissions, auth tokens, configs) | HIGH (user-facing file ops) | MEDIUM (internal/background)

Safe pattern exclusions: Check inside try/catch with retry. Check for logging/metrics only. Check + use wrapped in file lock.

Effort: S-M (replace check-then-use with direct use + error handling)

4. Deadlock Potential (CWE-833)

What: Lock acquisition in inconsistent order, or lock held during blocking operation.

Layer 1 -- Grep patterns:

Language
Pattern
Grep

Python
Nested locks
with\s+\w+_lock: (multiline: two different locks nested)

Python
Lock in loop
for.*: with \.acquire\(\) inside loop body

Python
Lock + external call
\.acquire\(\) followed by await|requests\.|urllib before release

Go
Missing defer unlock
\.Lock\(\) without defer.*\.Unlock\(\) on next line

Go
Nested locks
Two \.Lock\(\) calls in same function without intervening \.Unlock\(\)

Java
Nested synchronized
synchronized\s*\( (multiline: nested blocks with different monitors)

JS
Async mutex nesting
await\s+\w+\.acquire\(\) (two different mutexes in same function)

Layer 2 -- Critical questions:

Are these the same lock (reentrant = OK) or different locks (deadlock risk)?

Is the lock ordering consistent across all call sites?

Does the external call inside lock have a timeout?

Severity: CRITICAL (payment/auth) | HIGH (app freeze risk)

Safe pattern exclusions: Reentrant locks (same lock acquired twice). Locks with explicit timeout (asyncio.wait_for, tryLock).

Effort: L (lock ordering redesign)

5. Blocking I/O in Async Context (CWE-400)

What: Synchronous blocking calls inside async functions or event loop handlers.

Layer 1 -- Grep patterns:

Language
Blocking Call
Grep
Replacement

Python
time.sleep in async def
time\.sleep inside async def
await asyncio.sleep

Python
requests.* in async def
requests\.(get|post|put|delete) inside async def
httpx or aiohttp

Python
open() in async def
open\( inside async def
aiofiles.open

Node.js
fs.readFileSync in async
fs\.readFileSync|fs\.writeFileSync|fs\.mkdirSync
fs.promises.*

Node.js
execSync in async
execSync|spawnSync in async handler
exec with promises

Node.js
Sync crypto in async
crypto\.pbkdf2Sync|crypto\.scryptSync
crypto.pbkdf2 (callback)

Layer 2 -- Critical questions:

Is this in a hot path (API handler) or cold path (startup script)?

Is the blocking duration significant (>100ms)?

Is there a legitimate reason (e.g., sync read of small config at startup)?

Severity: HIGH (blocks event loop/async context) | MEDIUM (minor blocking <100ms)

Safe pattern exclusions: Blocking call in if __name__ == "__main__" (startup). readFileSync in config loading at init time. Sync crypto for small inputs.

Effort: S-M (replace with async alternative)

6. Resource Contention (CWE-362)

What: Multiple concurrent accessors compete for same resource without coordination.

Layer 1 -- Grep patterns:

Pattern
Risk
Grep

Shared memory without sync
Data corruption
SharedArrayBuffer|SharedMemory|shm_open|mmap without Atomics|Mutex|Lock nearby

IPC without coordination
Message ordering
process\.send|parentPort\.postMessage in concurrent loops

Concurrent file append
Interleaved writes
Multiple appendFile|fs\.write to same path from parallel tasks

Layer 2 -- Critical questions:

Are multiple writers actually concurrent? (Sequential = safe)

Is there OS-level atomicity guarantee? (e.g., O_APPEND for small writes)

Is ordering important for correctness?

Severity: HIGH (data corruption) | MEDIUM (ordering issues)

Safe pattern exclusions: Single writer pattern. OS-guaranteed atomic operations (small pipe writes, O_APPEND). Message queues with ordering guarantees.

Effort: M

7. Cross-Process & Invisible Side Effects (CWE-362, CWE-421)

What: Multiple processes or process+OS accessing same exclusive resource, including operations with non-obvious side effects on shared OS resources.

Layer 1 -- Grep entry points:

Pattern
Risk
Grep

Clipboard dual access
OSC 52 + native clipboard in same flow
osc52|\\x1b\\]52 AND clipboard|SetClipboardData|pbcopy|xclip in same file

Subprocess + shared file
Parent and child write same file
spawn|exec|Popen + writeFile|open.*"w" on same path

OS exclusive resource
Win32 clipboard, serial port, named pipe
OpenClipboard|serial\.Serial|CreateNamedPipe|mkfifo

Terminal escape sequences
stdout triggers terminal OS access
\\x1b\\]|\\033\\]|writeOsc|xterm

External clipboard tools
Clipboard via spawned process
pbcopy|xclip|xsel|clip\.exe

Layer 2 -- This check relies on reasoning more than any other:

Build Resource Inventory:

Resource
Exclusive?
Accessor 1
Accessor 2
Sync present?

Trace Timeline:

t=0ms  operation_A() -> resource_X accessed
t=?ms  side_effect   -> resource_X accessed by external process
t=?ms  operation_B() -> resource_X accessed again -> CONFLICT?

Critical Questions:

Can another process (terminal, OS, child) access this resource simultaneously?

Does this operation have invisible side effects on shared OS resources?

What happens if the external process is slower/faster than expected?

What happens if user triggers this action twice rapidly?

Severity: CRITICAL (two accessors to exclusive OS resource without sync) | HIGH (subprocess + shared file without lock) | HIGH (invisible side effect detected via reasoning)

Safe pattern exclusions: Single accessor. Retry/backoff pattern present. Operations sequenced with explicit delay/await.

Effort: M-L (may require removing redundant access path)

Scoring Algorithm

MANDATORY READ: Load references/audit_worker_core_contract.md and references/audit_scoring.md.

Output Format

MANDATORY READ: Load references/audit_worker_core_contract.md and references/templates/audit_worker_report_template.md.

Write JSON summary per references/audit_summary_contract.md. In managed mode the caller passes both runId and summaryArtifactPath; in standalone mode the worker generates its own run-scoped artifact path per shared contract.

Write report to {output_dir}/ln-628--global.md with category: "Concurrency" and checks: async_races, thread_safety, toctou, deadlock_potential, blocking_io, resource_contention, cross_process_races.

Return summary per references/audit_summary_contract.md.

When summaryArtifactPath is absent, write the standalone runtime summary under .hex-skills/runtime-artifacts/runs/{run_id}/evaluation-worker/{worker}--{identifier}.json and optionally echo the same summary in structured output.

Report written: .hex-skills/runtime-artifacts/runs/{run_id}/audit-report/ln-628--global.md
Score: X.X/10 | Issues: N (C:N H:N M:N L:N)

Critical Rules

MANDATORY READ: Load references/audit_worker_core_contract.md.

Do not auto-fix: Report only -- concurrency fixes require careful human review

Two-layer detection: Always apply Layer 2 reasoning after Layer 1 grep. Never report raw grep matches without context analysis

Language-aware detection: Use language-specific patterns per check

Unified CRITICAL escalation: Any finding in payment/auth/financial code = CRITICAL

Effort realism: S = <1h, M = 1-4h, L = >4h

Exclusions: Skip test files, skip single-threaded CLI tools, skip generated code

Definition of Done

MANDATORY READ: Load references/audit_worker_core_contract.md.

 contextStore parsed (language, concurrency model, output_dir)

 All 7 checks completed with two-layer detection:

async races, thread safety, TOCTOU, deadlock potential, blocking I/O, resource contention, cross-process races

 Layer 2 reasoning applied to each candidate (confirmed / FP / needs-context)

 Findings collected with severity, location, effort, recommendation

 Score calculated per references/audit_scoring.md

 Report written to {output_dir}/ln-628--global.md (atomic single Write call)

 Summary written per contract

Reference Files

Two-layer detection methodology: references/two_layer_detection.md

Audit output schema: references/audit_output_schema.md

Version: 4.0.0
Last Updated: 2026-03-04